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Abstract—Detection of abnormal BGP events is of great impor-
tance to preserve the security and robustness of the Internet inter-
domain routing system. In this paper, we propose an anomaly
detection framework based on machine learning techniques to
identify the anomalous events by training a model for normal
BGP-updates and measuring the extent of deviation from the
normal model during the abnormal occasions. Our preliminary
results show that the features generated and selected are capable
of improving the classification results to distinguish between
anomalies and normal BGP update messages. Furthermore,
the clustering results demonstrate the effectiveness of formed
models to detect the similar types of BGP anomalies. In a
more general context, an interdisciplinary research is performed
between network security and data mining to deal with real-
world problems and the achieved results are promising.
I. INTRODUCTION
Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is being considered as the
primary inter-domain routing protocol which maintains the
connectivity of the distinct segments of the Internet known as
autonomous systems (ASs). BGP is the protocol of maintain-
ing the table of core routing decisions for different prefixes
indicating the reachability between ASs. BGP routers send
the updates of AS path modifications to its peer ASs and the
changes occur based on path, network policies or rule sets.
So BGP is basically not a routing protocol but a reachability
protocol and since BGP only sends update information when
some changes taking place in the network topology or routing
policy, it is considered as an incremental protocol rather than
periodical protocol. Consequently, analyzing the intensity of
BGP updates makes sense on keeping the whole network more
stable and properly functioning.
BGP has enabled the Internet to efficiently become a
decentralized system. Therefore the stability and robustness of
the BGP is crucial to achieve the global communication goal
by preserving the connectivity of the entire network. However,
various abnormal events such as earthquakes, power outage,
misconfiguration, extensive worm attacks or other malicious
network activities, disable the reachability and stability of
particular parts of the network regionally or globally. Such
abnormal events affect the routing infrastructure and cause
delays, data loss and connectivity problems over the Internet.
Consequently, early detection of such sort of anomalies and
misbehaviors is of prominent significance to ensure the stabil-
ity, availability, and efficiency of the Internet.
In this study we present an anomaly detection framework
based on machine learning algorithms applied to well-known
BGP abnormal events. The anomaly detection systems, gen-
erally, try to make a model of normal behavior and announce
any deviation from that normal model as an anomaly. How-
ever, in this process there exist false alarms correspond to
harmless activities or less serious failure in the system being
signaled as anomalies. Therefore, the main objective of every
anomaly detector is to discover all possible abnormal activities
while minimizing the ratio of the false alarms. The proposed
anomaly detection framework in this study consists of three
main steps: feature extraction, feature selection, and feature
generation. First a set of features from BGP messages are
produced, then the most relevant features are selected, and
eventually new features are generated based on the correlation
of the selected features. The feature generation part deals with
the learning and classification process and utilizes the machine
learning algorithms, namely Support Vector Machines (SVM).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Some back-
ground studies and related works are briefly introduced in
section two. Section three explains the system architecture
and illustrates the main approaches applied in the framework.
In section four experimental setup and results are presented.
Finally section five concludes the paper and addresses some
future lines of work.
II. RELATED WORKS
Several studies have been conducted on network data to
discover BGP abnormal events. In an early line of work Li
et al [1] proposed an Internet Routing Forensics framework
to process BGP routing data and extract rules of abnormal
BGP events. They applied data mining techniques and train
the framework to learn the rules for different types of BGP
anomalies and showed that these rules are effective in detecting
the occurrences of the similar events. They utilized a feature
selection method to pick the features with the highest infor-
mation gain. The selected features in some cases match the
selected features of our method. However they select 9 features
among 35 for all the BGP events, while the set of our selected
features vary from dataset to dataset in addition to a number
of new features presented based on pairwise correlation of the
features.
In a similar approach to [1], Cazenave et al [2] applied data
mining algorithms to learn from labeled abnormal data and
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distinguish unseen BGP events. They have extracted several
numerical features for certain time bins and leveraged a
number of classifications algorithms, among which SVM had
outperformed the others, to detect similar type of events in
famous BGP events datasets. In another line of work, Dou
et al. [3] automatically formed the hierarchy of abnormal
BGP events by devising a clustering method and obtained
a set of classification rules which enabled them to label
unknown BGP events to the most similar category. However,
the proposed methodology is not always able to distinguish
the exact category in the lowest level of the hierarchy or even
differentiate the normal data from abnormal events. In this
study we obtained more precise results in terms of detection
of abnormal BGP events compared to the presented results in
[3].
Furthermore, Zhang et al [4] proposed an instant-learning
framework recognizing anomalies based on their deviation
from the normal dynamics of BGP updates. They applied
wavelet transforms to reveal temporal structure of update mes-
sages and utilize clustering algorithms to distinguish between
normal profiles and outliers.
III. DATA DESCRIPTON
This section describes the origin of the datasets, their
structure and other relevant aspects of the data.
1) Datasets: In this work we focus on six well-known
datasets containing abnormal BGP events. Three of them
(Nimda, Slammer and CodeRed) correspond to Internet worm
outbursts, whereas the other three (Eastcoast, Florida and
Katrina) represent extensive blackouts. Each dataset consists of
60 days of observation, starting approximately 30 days before
the beginning of the anomaly. The duration of anomalies
themselves varies from 16 hours to 4 days, as shown in I.
Since there is no publicly available data from a single remote
route collector (RRC) spanning all six events, Table I also
shows the RRC where dataset originated.
TABLE I
LIST OF BGP ABNORMAL EVENTS
Event Name RRC Date Duration
Nimda Worm rrc04, Geneva 18-Sep-2001 2 days
Slammer Worm Routviews,
Oregon
25-Jan-2003 1-2 days
Codered Worm rrc02, Paris 19-Jul-2001 16 hours
East-coast Black-
out
Routviews,
Oregon
14-Aug-
2003
2 days
Florida Blackout rrc11, USA 03-Sep-2004 4 days (1st day)
Katrina Blackout rrc14, USA 29-Aug-
2005
4 days (1st-2nd
days)
2) Features List: The raw BGP message data is retrieved
from a subset of the update archives of RoutViews [5] and
RIPE [6]. The events from the raw datasets are grouped into
one minute bins, and data conversion process, field filtering,
duplicate removal, and event measurement are performed on
the raw events. These steps are described in detail in [7]. From
the dataset, we extracted a number of features that are useful
for the identification of routing events and anomaly detection.
For instance, as the routers explore alternative paths due to a
routing event such as link failure or topological modification,
the number of BGP updates messages may change drastically.
Such alterations contribute to significant data features to build
various perspectives of routing dynamics that facilitate the use
of machine learning algorithms for anomaly detection.
The learning algorithm is applied to a set of 18 primary
features, listed in Table II. The number of BGP announcements
and withdrawals (parameters 1–3) are indicative of the Internet
routing dynamics. Since one BGP update message can involve
multiple prefixes and vice versa, there can be multiple updates
for a given prefix in a single bin. The number of updated
prefixes is considered in parameters 4–6. As Labovitz et al.
discussed in [8], routing instabilities might be classified as
forwarding instability, policy fluctuation, and pathologic (or
redundant) updates. In the sequence of BGP update messages
some types of successive events are defined which represent
instabilities belong to those categories (parameters 7–15). The
above mentioned parameters are described in more detail in
[1].
The number of reachable prefixes can be affected by large
scale anomalous events. Therefore, an additional feature we
used (parameter 18) that is the number of reachable prefixes
in each time bin. However, some prefixes can be reachable
through a single neighboring AS, meaning that they become
unreachable if, for some reason, the connection to the BGP
router(s) in that neighboring AS is lost. The number of active
eBGP peers was used as an additional feature (parameter 17)
to make it easier for the learning algorithm to deal with this
effect. Finally when a new eBGP peer is added or a connection
to a previously lost eBGP peer is restored, the routing tables
must be exchanged implying a large number of updates. Thus
we added a feature containing the number of peers performing
table transfers in the bin period, estimated from the logs (state
changes and updates).
IV. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
This section describes the architecture of the proposed
framework, its components and their operations. The main
functionality of the system is to select and generate the best
set of features with the highest correlation with the anomalous
data in its occurrence period. Figure 1 demonstrates the various
modules of the framework and the interaction between them.
The input data are basically BGP update messages on which
several pre-processing operation have been already performed
in [7]. The emerging features of the pre-processor component
are the main features for this work and the rest of the data
processing and classification algorithms will be described in
the following sections.
A. Data Normalizer
One of the early steps of pre-processing in this work
concerns the normalization of the data which is crucial when
dealing with parameters of different units and scales. Therefore
we applied the standardization on the data using Equation 1
to every features. Having subtracted the mean for each data
Fig. 1. The architecture of the proposed framework
TABLE II
BGP RELATED FEATURES’ LIST
ID Features Description
1 Announce # of announcements
2 Withdrawal # of withdrawals
3 Update # of updates (=Announce+Withdrawal)
4 AnnouPrefix # of announced prefix
5 WithdwPrefix # of withdrawn prefix
6 UpdatedPrefix # of updates prefixes (=AnnouPre-
fix+WithdwPrefx)
7 WWDup # of duplicate withdrawals
8 AADupType1 # of duplicate announcements (all fields are
the same)
9 AADupType2 # of duplicate announcements (only AS-
PATH and NEXT-HOP are the same)
10 AADiff # of new-path announcement (implicit with-
drawals)
11 WADupType1 # of re-announcements after withdrawing
the same path (all fields are the same)
12 WADupType2 # of re-announcements after withdrawing
the same path (only AS-PATH and NEXT-
HOP are the same)
13 WADup WADupType1 + WADupType2
14 WADiff # of new paths announced after withdrawing
na old path
15 AW # of withdrawals after announcing the same
path
16 NPeers # of peers
17 ReachPrefix # of BGP Atoms
18 TblExchgA table exchange status
point and dividing the result by the standard deviation we end
up having zero means and unit variance. This assumption is
regarded to scale the attribute data in order to fit in a specific
range and make the further computations meaningful.
xnormal =
x− µ
σ
(1)
B. Feature Generator
This module generates new features based on the correla-
tions between the original features derived from pre-processing
step. The motivation behind this work is to have a more
accurate anomaly estimation observing how the correlation of
variable pairs change during the normal period and when the
anomaly occurs. Correlation is a statistics that measures the
degree of relationship between two variables. The value of
correlation coefficient, a number between -1 and 1, shows
the extent to which two variables are proportional. As the
result of correlation does not depend on the measurement unit
scales, we feed the original features (before normalization)
to this module and obtain the new variables as the pairwise
correlations. In this study the Pearson’s correlation coefficient
is applied and the correlation significance test is performed
to calculate the reliability of the correlations (2). Given two
event-series x and y, the Pearson’s correlation coefficient is
defined as:
r =
∑N
i=1 (xi − µx)(yi − µy)
(N − 1)σxσy (2)
The significance level calculated for each correlation in-
dicates the quality of the magnitude and depends on the
size of the sample from which it was computed. In fact, the
significance result of two variables shows the probability that
the observed correlation has occurred by chance. Therefore,
in larger sample size we expect to observe higher reliability
without restricting the significance value to greater numbers.
More detail information can be found in [8]. However, in this
component, the correlations computed by Pearson’s method,
has passed the significance test afterwards to make sure the
reliability of the correlations and remove the insignificant ones
from the output.
C. Feature Selector
The main activity of this component is to pick the most
salient features that show the highest relation with the occurred
abnormal BGP event. As Figure 1 shows, two sets of variables
are provided for this component, first normalized features
derived from the pre-processing module and second correlated
features as the output of the feature generator module. Any
of these variables that reveal the greatest change during the
Fig. 2. The values of some sample features of Slammer dataset in a 15 minutes time bin. Period of anomaly is marked with red and the horizontal red lines
show the abnormality threshold above which abnormal data is detected a) Correlation between Announce and WADup b) Withdrawal c) Correlation between
Update and WADiff d) ReachPrefix
anomaly period and remain unchanged in the normal period,
obtain higher score to be selected for the classification phase.
Hence, two important aspects is considered to present a feature
as the selected one, larger number of detected changes in
the time of anomaly, and less false alarms during the normal
period.
To detect the amount of deviation from the normal behavior,
it is assumed that the variable has normal distribution and
any value beyond the (µ± 2σ) is considered as an outlier or
abnormality. To calculate the total anomaly score of a variable
we perform majority vote to smooth the signal of approved
changes, means from every k time bins we select the greater
number of Normal or Abnormal occurrences and announce the
entire bin as Normal or Abnormal. Eventually, the candidate
features are the ones with more number of abnormalities in
the anomaly period and less abnormal samples in the normal
periods (confusion matrix). In Figure 2 two sets of acceptable
and non-acceptable variables are displayed and the range of
approved changes for each variable is demonstrated by the red
horizontal lines.
D. SVM Classifier
The SVM classifier is applied on the datasets of well-known
BGP events and the aforementioned features, to distinguish
between normal data and abnormal events. The model is
built based on one-classifier SVM for the purpose of novelty
detection. In fact the model is trained with the normal data and
is expected to mark abnormal events when there is a mismatch
with the normal model. In the next section more results are
demonstrated in details reflecting how different modules of the
proposed framework operate.
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In the first set of experiments conducted on six BGP
abnormal events, one SVM model is built for each data set
separately. The normal models belong to the clean period of
each data set before the occurrence of the abnormal event.
Then the test set, containing 50% of unseen normal data and
50% of abnormal data are passed to the model to verify the
ability of detecting normal and abnormal data. Applying one-
classification SVM with the parameters identified by the tune
method in R for the Slammer dataset provided us with the
results presented in Table III.
TABLE III
ANOMALY DETECTION RESULTS FOR SLAMMER DATASET
Data Features
(n=number of features)
Anomalies
Detected
(True
Positive)
False
Alarms
Accuracy
All Features (n=18) 100% 98% 51%
Selected Features (n=6) 82% 12% 85%
Selected Features + New
Features (n=4+4)
99% 3% 98%
As previously discussed, the highest number of anomalies
detected along with the lowest rate of false alarms is the
most promising case which is obtained in the third case
represented in Table III. In the first row of the above table, all
the normalized features have been selected and the model is
trained blindly using the attributes of all these variables. In the
second row the model is built based on the selected features
and in the third row a combination of selected features and
new features are provided to yield the highest precision and
lowest false alarms. Combining the selected set of features and
the new features as the most prominent features and feeding
them to the SVM classifier achieve the recognition rate of 99%
of the anomalies while producing only 3% of false alarms.
Noticeable improvement of the detection rate and false alarms
results demonstrate the superiority of the proposed methods
in feature selection and feature generation phases.
In Table VI detection results are demonstrated for all the
BGP events in this experiment. It must be considered that
the results are based on the best set of features for each data
set. Except from the Codered sample, the true positive rate of
anomalies detected are extremely high, in some cases close to
100% that to best of our knowledge is the best results ever
acquired. However the Codered result is also acceptable to
some extent. Other metrics mentioned in Table VI, accuracy
and precision, provide more precise prospect of the obtained
results, both for the true positive rate and false negative
frequency.
A very important aspect of each anomaly detection model
is its capacity to be generalized, means in what extent the built
model is able to detect the similar new failures in the future.
To achieve this goal, we examined every BGP abnormal event
towards the other models and measure the distance between
pairs of models to perceive the similarity of the six events
described earlier.
The outcome of anomaly detection accuracy for each of the
aforementioned abnormal events against different models are
presented in Table IV. The columns show the model built upon
specific data sets and the rows entitle the data sets regarding
the BGP events. Hence, it is expected to have the most accurate
results on the main diagonal, testing a data set for the same
model built on top of the identical set of features. However,
there is an exception when testing the Slammer data against
the Nimda model which produced the more accurate result
for Slammer rather than Nimda itself. The accuracy matrix
provided is clearly not symmetric. Therefore, we utilized a
distance measure defined in [9] to capture the mutual fitness
of two data sets. In Equation 3, AM stands for the accuracy
matrix and d shows the distance evaluated between abnormal
events of i and j.
d(i, j) = |AM(i, i)+AM(j, j)−AM(i, j)−AM(j, i)| (3)
In this equation, the terms AM(i, i) and AM(j, j) indicate
the feasibility of the model given its own fitted test set. The
cross terms AM(i, j) and AM(j, i) show the likelihood of
a detection output generated by the fitted model of another
data set. If the accuracy value of AM(i, j) and AM(j, i) are
proportionally high and closely equal, it indicates a very small
distance between abnormal events of i and j. In other cases,
when the model i is best fitted with the data of j but the model
j do not provide an accurate detection result for data of i, the
evaluated distance might be relatively larger. The conclusive
distance matrix is shown in Table V.
Having generated the distance matrix of the BGP abnormal
events, a clustering method (kmeans in R) is performed on
the six data sets to observe how the similar events can be
detected by the closest models. Clustering with k=2, precisely
provided two separate groups of worm attacks and extensive
blackout. Extending the clusters to k=3, put the Eastcoast apart
while the rest of the events remained in the same groups. This
classification implies that similar new BGP abnormalities are
detectable with a bounded error while applying the models of
the same type of abnormality without the necessity of having
the identical set of features.
VI. DISCUSSION
In this work, we analyzed BGP behavior for two types of
BGP abnormalities, worm attacks and extensive blackouts. We
extract a number of metrics from the enumeration process
performed on BGP update messages and several features are
generated from the correlation between variable pairs. The
final SVM model is created based on the top ranked set
of features for the normal data and are tested for detecting
BGP abnormal events for the unseen data. The achieved
results regarding the detection accuracy and precision show
a considerable improvement over the selected set of features
and generated set of features. Output in Table VI indicate the
TABLE IV
DETECTION RATE OF BGP EVENTS WITH DISTINCTIVE DATASETS
Nimda Ds. Slammer Ds. Codered Ds. Eastcoast Ds. Florida Ds. Katrina Ds.
Nimda Mdl. 99% 100% 82% 85% 70% 62%
Slammer Mdl. 90% 100% 81% 50% 32% 50%
Codered Mdl. 70% 51% 91% 45% 55% 49%
Eastcoast Mdl. 50% 50% 50% 100% 50% 54%
Florida Mdl. 51% 50% 50% 41% 91% 50%
Katrina Mdl. 53% 77% 63% 62% 60% 90%
TABLE V
DISTANCE MATRIX OF BGP EVENTS
Nimda Ds. Slammer Ds. Codered Ds. Eastcoast Ds. Florida Ds. Katrina Ds.
Nimda Mdl. 0 9 38 64 69 74
Slammer Mdl. 9 0 59 100 105 63
Codered Mdl. 38 59 0 96 77 69
Eastcoast Mdl. 64 100 96 0 100 74
Florida Mdl. 69 105 77 100 0 71
Katrina Mdl. 74 63 69 74 71 0
Fig. 3. Clustering similar BGP events
TABLE VI
ANOMALY DETECTION RESULTS BASED ON THE BEST SET OF FEATURES
IN ALL DATASETS
Data Set Anomalies
Detected
(True
Positive)
Accuracy Precision
Nimda 96% 95% 94%
Slammer 99% 98% 97%
Codered 88% 88% 88%
East-coast 100% 97% 94%
Florida 100% 83% 75%
Katrina 97% 92% 88%
prominent results of anomaly detection in BGP events under
investigation.
Due to the fact that BGP anomalies happen rarely in
a long period of time and false alarms occur quite often,
the results are recommended to be evaluated by network
administrating team that might require re-estimation of the
results, detected anomalies vs. false positive ratio. However,
the results acquired in this study presented the most accurate
results ever achieved in this context compared to the state of
the art.
An important direction of work is done in the time of
detecting one BGP abnormality with a model made from
another event data with different set of salient features. The
emerging clusters show that BGP events originated from the
same cause, worm or blackout, are more likely to be located
in the same group and more probable to be detected by similar
models. The hierarchy demonstrated in Figure 3 has some
similarities with the hierarchy of BGP events presented in
[3], for example the close distance of Nimda and Slammer,
these two with the Codered, or Katrina and Florida with each
other. However, the clusters of this work makes more sense
when putting the same type of BGP events in the same group
as it allows the network manager to distinguish the closest
model for anomaly detection purposes or the possible root
cause diagnoses.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS
In this work we proposed an anomaly detection framework
applied on BGP traffic data based on a feature extraction
and generation approaches. The methodology used for feature
generation and selection in this study provided promising
results with high precision in anomaly detection and low
false positives which outperformed the existing results of
BGP anomaly detection both in detection rate and hierarchy
estimation of the BGP events.
Open issues of this work include improving the obtained
results by decreasing the false positive rate while keeping the
detection precision high.
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